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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes an overlapping generations economy with multiple family dynasties
in which the abihty levels of children are random and unobservable. Each parent allocates
his income between consumption and investment in the education of his child. Each child, in
turn, decides how much effort toexert in school on the basis of his perceived marginal returns
to schooling, a perception shaped in part by the child's perception of themarginal returns
to "schooling attained by his parent. The income tax policies available to government range
from hbertarian (no redistribution) to perfectly egalitarian (equalization of after-tax family
incomes in each period), where all income transfers are financed by current tax receipts.
It is shown that policies resulting in small income transfers from richer to poorer families
can increase social welfare by enabling poorer families to invest more optimally in their
children, and by reducing uncertainty about future income. However, the taxes which fund
the transfers also lower the expected marginal returns to schooling perceived by each child.
As the tax policy becomes more egalitarian, the disincentive effects on schooling effort soon
become dominant. In the hmit, the perfectly egalitarian tax policy results in per capita
income and social welfare levels that are well below those achieved under the libertarian tax
policy. These adverse effects become more pronounced as the number of dynasties increases.
The authors are grateful to J. Gray and H. Lapan for helpful comments.
I. Introduction
The relationship between human capital and lifetime earnings is well-established in the
economics literature. Particularly well-established is the positive link between increased
years of education and increased real earnings. This link is apparent across all ethnic and
racial groupings in the United States and, indeed, seems similarly well-established in other
developed and lesser-developed countries [Schultz (1988, pp. 616-617)].
Unfortunately, absent public intervention, optimal investment in human capital is unlikely
to occur. Applying the usual neoclassical principle, the Pareto optimal investment rule would
be for each child to be educated up to the point where the present value of the investment
costs are equal to the expected present value offuture returns [Becker (1975), Rosen (1977) .
But investors in human capital are typically not able to use anticipated future earnings as
collateral due to restrictions on indentured servitude and slavery.
Because of this capital market imperfection, investments in a child's human capital will
generally be tied to the well-being of his parents rather than to his owninnate skills and earn
ings capacity. If the costs of human capital investment are substantial, liquidity constraints
on the poor will cause an underinvestment (from society's perspective) in the education of
poor children. In addition, thesuboptimal stock ofhuman capital embodied in poor children
will inflate the returns to human capital for wealthy children. As a consequence, there will
be an overinvestment (from society's perspective) in the education ofwealthy children.
This issue is discussed by Loury (1981) in his classic article on intergenerational transfers
of wealth. Loury sets out a two-period lived overlapping generations model in which the
ability levels of children are randomly distributed and unobservable. Kach parent, concerned
for the utility attained by his child, allocates his income between his own consumption
and his investment in the human capital of his child. The public provision of education
through purely redistributive nondistortionary tax policies is shown to improve social welfare
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by removing the linkage between family income and educational investment. Subsequent
researchers have generalized Loury's model in a number of directions. For example, Durlauf
(1991) assumes that famiUes endogehously organize themselves into neighborhoods, and that
the amount of human capital that parents invest in their children is primarily determined
by neighborhood characteristics.
An important issue remains to be addressed, however. Is the distortion in the educational
investment in poorer children due solely to the absence ofa human capital loanmarket, and
hence to the unequal access of children to educational opportunity? Or can the distortion
also be attributed in part to incentive problems that cause the children, themselves, to make
inefficient use of the educational opportunities that they receive?
A commonly maintained assumption in traditional models of intergenerational transfers
between parents and children is that the children are passive recipients of humaji capital
investment.^ Variations in human capital and educational attainments across children are
attributed todifferences in parental income and tastes and in children's endowments of ability
or luck rather thanto any choices made by the children themselves. Infact, however, children
have considerable latitude in the amount of time eind effort they devote to schooling. Children
can select how many years to invest in schooling beyond their sixteenth year. Before that,
children can vary the effort they expend on learning by truancy, shirking in school, homework,
or extracurricular activities. Parents have only a partial influence on these choices.
Akey factor influencing the amount of time and effort a child devotes to his schooling is
the child s perceived returns to education Becker (1975) . Nondistortionary redistributive
tax policies of the type analyzed by Loury (1981, p. 866) are unlikely to be feasible politically
or administratively, as he himself points out. Rather, transfers to the poor are typically
endogenous growth studies [e.g., Lucas (1988), Ikmura (1991), and Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992)] assume that apnts with direct control over physical resources invest in their own human capital in
order to maximize their lifetime utility, with or without the additional support of abequest. Here we retain
the traditional assumption that children do not have any direct control over the physical resources devoted
to their education.
funded by income taxes, and such taxes can distort individual choices. In particular, income
taxes designed to equalize educational opportunity can cloud the perceptions of children
regarding the returns to education per se, leading them to make inefficient use of educational
opportunities.
This paper extends Loury (1981) in two principal ways. First, the child's decision re
garding the effort he devotes to his schooling is explicitly incorporated into Loury's human
capital investment problem. The child's effort in school is assumed to depend upon the
child's perception of his marginal returns to schooling, which in turn is shaped by his per
ception of the marginal returns to schooling attained by his parent. Thus, "neighborhood
effects" in the form of family influences have a direct impact upon the child's behavior.
Second, the treatment of government tax pohcy within our model has several novel fea
tures. Only distortionary income tax policies are available to government in its attempt to
redistribute income from richer to poorer families. Also, the government is forced to satisfy
a hard budget constraint in every period, in the sense that all distributed subsidies must be
financed by current tax receipts. In contrast, Loury (1981, p. 853) only requires that gov
ernment satisfy an expected budget constraint in making its period 1 plans for current and
future periods. Finally, the tax policy in our model is characterized by a single parameter.
As this parameter is increased from zero to an upper bound, the tax policy progresses from
a purely libertarian policy with no redistribution ofincome to a perfectly egalitarian policy
under which family incomes are equalized in each period. This permits us to analyze and
compare welfare and income outcomes across a broad range of tax policies.
Our model demonstrates that simply equalizing educational opportunity, say through
income transfers to poor families, will not necessarily result in Pareto optimal human cap
ital investments. The crucial observation is that the government's tax policy can lower a
child's perception of his marginal returns to schooling at the same time that it equalizes
parental income transfers to children. We find, in particular, that a small degree of income
Jsubsidization for low income families does increase human capital production, raising both
social welfare and GNP. Yet social welfare and GNP both decline precipitously as govern
ment imposes progressively more egalitarian tax policies. Moreover, increasing the number
of famihes in existence at each point in time exacerbates these disincentive effects.
The basic human capital investment model is set out in section II. A central way in which
this model differs fromLoury (1981) is in its inclusion of a behavioral relation describing the
schooling effort of the child. In section III it is shown that this behavioral relation can be
. motivated using a model of human capital investment outlined in Becker (1975; pp. 94-144).
In sections IV and V the dynamic properties of the basic humancapital investment model are
investigated for particular functional specifications chosen to match as closely as possible the
specifications of Loury (1981) for comparison purposes. The results of extensive simulation
experiments are reported in section VL The final section VII gives concluding comments.
II. The Basic Economy
This section sets out a model, referred to as the "Basic Economy," which generalizes the
model used by Loury (1981) to investigate the relation between human capital investment,
income distribution, and government tax and transfer policies. Loury assumes that the
subsequent earnings of a child are determined by two factors: innate abiHty; and parental
investment in the child's education. In the Basic Economy it is assumed that the child's
subsequent earnings are also determined in part by the intensity of effort which the child
devotes to his schooling.
Specifically, the Basic Economy is an overlapping generations (OG) economy which be
gins in period 1 and extends into the infinite future. The economy consists of a consumer
sector and a government policymaker with tax and transfer powers. The rate of population
growth is constant and equal to zero. Each agent lives for just two periods, a first period
( childhood ) and a second period ("parenthood"). One child is born to each agent at the
beginning of his second period of life. The economy has only one consumable resource, Q,
assumed to be completely perishable and divisible. Adopting the standard convention that
goods are distinguished by date of availability, the amount of Q available during period t
represents "good i." The economy thus has an infinite number of goods.
In the initial period 1, the population consists of N parents and N children, divided
into N parent-child pairings. The N pairings constitute N distinct "family dynasties,"
i = Each child born in a subsequent period t is then assigned to one of the N
family dynasties on the basis of the dynasty belonged to by his parent.
Without loss ofgenerality, attentionwill focused in this section onanyonefamily dynasty,
say dynasty i. Dynasty i in the initial period 1 consists of one parent, Pn, together with
his child Cn. The parent Pn is assumed to have an exogenously given amount of pre-tax
earnings yn measured in period 1 good, and is also characterized by an exogenously given
intensity ofeffort level n^o representing the effort which he put into his schooling as a child.
In each subsequent period t > 2, dynasty i then consists of one parent born in period
/ —1, together with the child Ca of Pn born at the beginning of period t.
In each period ^ > 1, the child Ca is endowed with an unobservable random skill level
cxit for producing where qh G [0,1 . In addition, his parent Pit might choose to invest
a certain amount of resources e,*( in his education, where en is measured in period t good.
Finally, the child himself must decide how much intensity ofeffort rtu hewishes to devote in
school to his education. The level of pre-tax earnings yi,t+i achieved by the child Cn when he
reaches adulthood in the subsequent period ^-|-1 is assumed to depend positively on all three
factors. Formally, then the child's income (or human capital production) function takes the
form
yi,t+l — } ^1 > 0, ^2 ^ 0) ^3 > 0 , (1)
where yi,t+i is measured in good f + 1,
Suppose the government policymaker at the beginning of period 1selects a tax policy
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r for determining the taxes and subsidies to be imposed on the earnings of each parent in
each subsequent period. Let th denote the tax or subsidy level imposed on the dynasty i
parent Pit in period t under tax policy r, where th < 1 denotes a tax and r,-( > 1 denotes a
subsidy (or "negative tax"). The after-tax earnings of Pit then take the form Tayit- It will
be supposed that Tit is determined as some function (?(•) of the pre-tax earned incomes yjt,
j = 1,..., TV, for the N dynasties in period t, the tax policy r, and the total number of
dynasties N. That is,
Tit = Gi{yu,---,yNur,N) . (2)
The child Cn must decide on the intensity of effort nu he devotes to his schooling.
In accordance with numerous empirical studies, it will be assumed that Cit is positively
influenced in this decision by two factors: (a) the amount of resources which his parent
invests in his education; and (b) his expected rate of return to schooling effort, denoted by
where
= (dri^t+iyi,t+i/dnitY . (3)
Formally, the intensity of effort nu takes the functional form^
nit = , nj > 0, riz > 0 . (4)
It follows from (4) that a parent can influence the education of his child in two different
ways. First, a parent can directly transfer resources to his child through the human capital
investment level e,'^ . The investment level reflects the extent of government taxes and
transfers, since it is allocated out of disposable income. Second, as will be clarified below,
the information the child obtains about his pjirent's income and effort levels can influence
the child's expected rate ofreturn to schooling effort.
In section III, we provide additional motivation for the functional specification (4) by deriving it from
certain fundamental cost-benefit relations detailed in Becker (1975, pp. 94-144).
The parent Pa faces a more compHcated decision problem in period t than his child.
Specifically, he must decide how much of his disposable income to devote to his own con
sumption versus how much to devote to investment in the education of his child. The utility
attained by Pn in period t is assumed to be a function of his own period t
consumption, and the utility K'.t+i he anticipates for his child in period i + 1.
Let Sit denote the state vector describing the situation of the parent P^ at the beginning
ofperiod t in terms ofhis pre-tax earnings yny his past schooling effort and his income
tax or subsidy level r,(, as well as the government's tax policy r and the total number of
dynasties N. That is, define
Sit = {yiuni^t-i,rit,T,N) , (5)
The state vector (5) represents the information which is potentially available to the child Cu
in period t. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suppose that the child's expected rate of
return to schooling effort, described in (3), is determined as some function
^it = (6)
of the state vector (5).
It follows from (6) that the child's expectations regarding returns to schooling are po
tentially affected by the tax policy r, as well as his family's particular tax or transfer level
Tit. Thus, the tax system can influence the child's schooling effort—i.e., his human capital
investment decision by distorting the child's perceived returns to schooling. In contrast,
in Loury (1981) the schooling effort of the child is effectively held constant, implying that
the tax system cannot influence the human capital investment decision of the child. The
importance of the potential influence of the tax system on human capital investment by
children is illustrated for a special case of the Basic Economy in section IV, below.
Given (1), (4), and (6), the state vector satisfies a recurrence relation of the form
Si,t+i = i HGCit,eit,n{eit,r''{sit)), n{eit,r''{sit)),Ti,t+i,T, N) (7)
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= e,-i, r,•,(+!,5,•() .
The budget set facing Pit in period t takes the form
= {(c,i, e.-t) > 0 ICit + tit = ntVit} • (8)
The 'value function" V((5i() for the parent is then defined to be the maximum expected
utility attainable by Pit in period given the budget set By construction, this value
function satisfies a dynamic programming recurrence relation of the form
Vt{sit) = max I , (9)
subject to being given by relation (7). The 5,(-conditional expectation in (9) is taken
with respect to the ability level Oit and the tax rate appearing in (7). Note that this
construction implies that the parent knows the income function ft(') and the function 7i(*)
which determines the intensity of effort levels of children.
Acentral way in which our model differs from that of Loury (1981) is the introduction
of the behavioral relation (4) describing the schooling effort of the child. It is therefore
important to provide additional motivation for this feature of the model. In the next section
it is shown that relation (4) is consistent with the view that.the child makes rational use of
limited information to decide on the allocation of his time during his schooling years. Thus,
in contrast with other recent studies of human capital investment [e.g., Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992)], the child solves a local optimization problem involving his current schooling
experience rather than a global optimization problem involving the intertemporal allocation
of physical resources and a concern for future generations.
ni. Factors Determining a Child's Optimal Schooling Effort
In his Woytinsky lecture, Becker (1975, pp. 94-144) outlines amodel in which individual
human capital investment and the return to this investment are simultaneously determined
by a downward sloping curve depicting the marginal return to education and an upward
sloping curve depicting the marginal cost of financing education. Here we adapt Becker's
model to the determination of how much effort a child will expend in school.
Let Tit represent the effort a child expends in school. Effort represents the proportion
of time the child actively invests in learning, e.g., by paying attention in school, studying,
reading, and so forth. While truancy laws may require that all children spend time in school,
this time only produces human capital when the child is concentrating on learning. Using
Leibowitz' (1974) terms, truancy laws have tended to equalize human capital investment
at the extensive margin (years of school); but there is still a considerable range of choice
regarding theintensity ofinvestment as measured by class attendance, homework completion,
and extra-curricular learning.
The marginal return to schooling effort of a child in period t, denoted by MR\ is given
by the derivative of the child's adult after-tax earnings Zt+i = Tt+iyt+i in period i + 1with
respect to the child's schooling effort Ut in period t. This marginal return is assumed to be
a decreasing function of the the child's schooHng effort n^, an increasing function of parental
investment e^, and an increasing function of the child's natural ability at; i.e..
MR = dzt+ildnt = MR{nt,et,at) , MR^<0, MR,>0, MR^ > 0. (10)
The marginal cost to schooling effort of a child in period t, denoted by MC\ is assumed to be
an increasing function of schoofing effort rit and a decreasing function of parental investment
et; i.e.,
MC = MC{nt,et) , > 0, MC, <0. (11)
The negative relationship between the marginal return MR^ and the level of schooling
effort Ut is easily justified. The production of human capital is presumably subject to di
minishing returns to all inputs, including effort. Consequently, the amount of human capital
produced by successive incremental increases in effort will tend to decline. This in turn
implies that the earnings generated from successive incremental increases in effort will tend
to decline. As noted by Becker (1975, p. 98), diminishing returns to human capital invest
ment are a necessary consequence of the fact that human capital must be embodied in the
individual doing the investing.
The positive relationship between the marginal cost MC" and the level of schooling effort
rit can be justified on the basis that the child obtains utility from leisure time. In this case,
schooling effort has an hedonic cost associated with it. If utility from leisure is subject to
diniinishing marginal returns, then the marginal hedonic cost of schooling effort will rise
with increased schooling effort (decreased leisure).
The assumption that marginal return MR^ and marginal cost MC^ increase and decrease,
respectively, with an increase in the amount of parental investment Ct in the child's education
can be justified on the basis that the child has more material resources to work with for any
given level of ability and schooling effort. This both improves his productivity (increases
his marginal return) and makes schooUng easier (decreases his marginal cost). Finally, an
increase in the child's natural ability at is plausiblyassumed to result in an increase in MR^
for any given level of paxental investment and schooling effort, since at is defined to be a
measure of the child's innate productive capacity.
The child is assumed to choose his optimal effort level, n*, by equating his marginal cost
to his expected marginal return; i.e.,
MC = MC{nt,et) = (MR'Y . (12)
The optimal effort level will differ across children depending upon the level of parental
investment e/ and the child s natural ability at. As depicted in Figure 1, the marginal return
curve shifts up and the marginal cost curve shifts down ifparental investment increases from
ti to Cf. As a result, the optimal effort level nj" increases with increases in et, although the
marginal return to effort may either rise or fall.
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—Figure 1 About Here-
Consequently, it follows from (12) that the child's optimal effort level n* takes the form
< = n(e,, {MR*)") , (13)
where n(') is an increasing function of both parental investment and expected marginal
return to schooling effort (MR^y. The correspondence with the assumed relation (4) for the
child's schooling effort is immediate.
IV. An Illustrative Special Case of the Basic Economy
In this section, the dynamic properties of the Basic Economy are investigated for particu
lar specifications for the incomefunction, the intensity of effort function, the utiUty function,
and the tax policy set out in general form in section II. These specifications are chosen to
match as closely as possible the example studied by Loury (1981, pp. 855-857).
Consider, then, a special case of the Basic Economy in which the income function (1) for
each dynasty i in each period t is given by
= h{ait,eit,nit) (14)
= A•{ai,r •{enT •{nitY
for arbitrary positive constants A, m, u, and v with 0 < (u+ u) < 1. Suppose, also, that the
intensity of effort function (4) for each dynasty i in each period t is given by
n.t = «(eit,r'(5,-()) (15)
=
for arbitrary positive constants a and bsatisfying 0< (a+ 6) < 1.
The utility attained by each dynasty i parent Pa in each period t is assumed to be given
by
Uit = (citT • , (16)
11
where c,( denotes the period t consumption of Pit, Vi,t+i denotes the utility which Pa an
ticipates for his child in period i + 1, and 7 is an arbitrary constant assumed to satisfy
® 7 < 1'^ Suppose (1 —'y)''yi,t+k remains bounded as k becomes arbitrarily large. If
anticipations are correct, it then follows that
log(£/,-0 = 7 log(c,0 + (1 - 7) log K-.t+i (17)




Consequently, the ex post "true" utility of each dynjisty i parent Pa in each period i is a
function of the consumption levels of all current and future members of dynasty i.
Thegovernment must select a tax policy which is budgetarily feasible. Since the resource
Qfor the Basic Economy is nonstorable, budgetary feasibility in each period t requires that
the sum of the after-tax incomes of the N dynasties should not exceed the sum of their
before-tax incomes.** Letting denote the tax or subsidy imposed on the dynasty i parent
Pit in period the condition expressing this feasibility is
N N
Y^^ritVit < Y^yit . (18)
«=i 1=1
It will be supposed that the government selects a tax policy from among a family of
feasible tax policies parameterized by r, where r lies in the interval [0,1/JV]. Specifically,
given any r in [0,1/7V], and given the pre-tax income levels {yit : i = I,..., N} o{ the N
dynasties in period tj the tax or subsidy level th imposed on each parent Pit is determined
•. ^ ~ H places no weight on their progeny, and hence do not invest in education. Given (14)this in turn dooms all future generations to have zero income.
^Loury (1981, Def. 3, p. 853) calls a tax policy "purely redistributive" if it satisfies such agovernment
budget constraint mexpeciaiton. However, Loury does not require that government actually satisy its budget
constraint m each period t, as is imposed here.
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by the relation
TitVit = [1 - (iV - l)r] •yu 4- r • . (19)
First note that the tax policies r in [0,1/A'^ ] all satisfy the budget feasibility condition
(18) with exactequality, by construction. Moreover, the tax policies range from "hbertarian"
to "egalitarian" as r ranges from 0 to l/N. Given the tax policy r = 0, the tax rates are
identically equal to 1, implying that no redistribution is undertaken. On the other hand, the
tax policy r = 1/iV is egalitarian in the sense that each of the N dynasties in each period t
receives precisely l/N of the total income earnings of the N dynasties. Given any existing
configuration of pre-tax incomes, the tax policy becomes progressively more egalitarian as r
ranges from 0 to 1/A^, in the sense that the variance of after-tax incomes declines.
More can now be said about r,®, the marginal return to schooling effort anticipated by
the dynasty i child Ca in period t. Recall from section II, relation (3), that is assumed
to be measured in terms of C.-f's after-tax income earnings for period t I. Let ra denote
the actual marginal return to schooling effort attained by Cit in the subsequent period i + 1.
Using (14) and (19), one has
= 9Ti^t+iyi,t+ildnit (20)
= ^[1 -(N - l)r]yi^t+i/dnit
= [1~{N - l)T]dyi,t+i/dnit
= [1-(A^-1)7)7; •[?/,•,.
Thus, the marginal return to schooling effort, r,-(, is proportional to the average return to
schooling effort, yi^t+ilna. Note that [1 —(A''—l)r] is nonnegative for all r in the admissable
range [0, l/A'" .
In section II, is assumed to be a function r®(5i() of the state vector sn consisting of
the information which is potentially available to the child Ca in period t. In keeping with
this assumption, it will be supposed here that the child estimates his own average return to
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schooling effort, yt,(+i/n,-<, by considering the average return to schooling effort attained by
his parent, Thus,^
rf, = (21)
= [1 - (A^ - l)r]u • [yulrii^t-i, -
It follows from (21) that, for each child, the expected marginal return to schooling effort
declines with increases in r, i.e., with increases in the degree of egalitarianism of the gov
ernment's tax policy. As will be clarified in section VI, this negative effect can offset the
positive effect of income transfers on human capital investment.
Finally, restrictions will be placed on the stochastic properties of the model. First, it
will be supposed that the random ability levels of children across the dynasties i = 1, •••, iV
axe governed by stationary independent probability distributions (/i(-)? •••5//v(*))
period t. Second, it will be supposed that each dynasty i parent believes he is unable, by his
own actions, to affect the tax or subsidy level to be imposed on his child. More precisely,
given any function J(r,-,t+i) of r,it will be supposed that the Sif-conditioned expected
value of formed by the parent takes the form
E[J(Ti^t+i) ISit] = E[J{Ti,t+i) ITii,r,7V] . (22)
Thus, Pit believes that the information in thestate vector 5,-^ = {yn^ ni^t-iy thi t-, N) regarding
his own pre-tax earnings yit and his own intensify of schooling effort Ui^t-i is not relevant
for estimating the tax or subsidy level Ti^t+i to be imposed on his child. Essentially, this
reduces to assuming that each parent views himself as being too small to affect government
tax policy..
®This expectational assumption is consistent with the views of Murray (1984), Wilson (1987), Case and
Katz (1991), and Streufert (1991), among others, who argue that children can have clouded perceptions of
the true returns to schooling because their primary source of information is their own immediate family
and neighborhood. Nevertheless, as argued by Manski (1991), more empirical work is needed to learn how
children actually do infer their returns to schooling.
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V. Dynamic Properties of the Illustrative Basic Economy
Given the functional forms specified in section IV, this section proves a number of propo
sitions for the Basic Economy. It is demonstrated that for all tax policies, the parent will
invest somepositiveamount in his child's humancapital. This holds even under the perfectly
egalitarian tax policy. However, in the long run, the expected income and schooling effort
levels of each dynasty are strictly lower under the egalitarian than under the libertarian tax-
policy. Furthermore, the gap between the egalitarian and libertarian outcomes increases as
the number of dynasties increases. The reason is that the expected long-run marginal return
to schooling effort decreases unambiguously as the number ofdynasties increases in the egal
itarian economy, but is unaffected by the number of dynasties in the libertarian economy.
Thus, the economy that attempts to redistribute income equally among all of its citizens is
plagued by free-rider effects that drive expected income and schooling effort toward zero as
the number of dynasties increases.
Formal statements of these and other propositions are presented below, and proofs are
given in the Appendix. The first proposition provides a more concrete analytical represen
tation for the recurrence relation satisfied by the value function 1^(5^).
PROPOSITION "Vtl Suppose the value function for the child Cu upon reaching adulthood
in period t + 1 can be expressed in the form
for some nonnegative coefficient vector I3t+i = (St+uOt+i)' and some function K{l3t+i,gi,t+i)
of ^t+i <tnd = {Ti,t+iyTiN). Then the value function for the parent Pn of Ca in period
t takes the form
ytisit) = {yuY' • , (24)
where jSt = [StyOt)' is a nonnegative coefficient vector which satisfies a matrix recurrence
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relation of the form
A = 771- + (1-7)MA+i , (25)
and K[^f, Qit) satisfies a recurrence relation of the form
\9it] ' (26)
As a corollary to PropositionV.l, it can be shown that the period t optimal consumption
and investment levels for the dynasty i parent are proportional to his period t after-tax
income.
COROLLARY V.l: Under the assumptions of Proposition V.l, the parent Pa's optimal
choices for human capital investment and consumption ca take theform
4 = ritVit • (1 - 7)w'm/[7 + (1 - 7)w^t+il ; (27)
cu = TitVit •7/[7 + (1 - 7)^t't+i] > (28)
where Wt+i = (u + av)St+i - aOt+i, t>l.
As indicated by Proposition V.l and Corollary V.l, both the value function and the
optimal consumption and investment decisions of the dynasty i parent have a nonstationary
structure if the coefficient vector = (St^Ot) that parameterizes the value function (24)
changes over time. As established in the next Proposition V.2, however, the recurrence
relation for has a unique stationary solution.
PROPOSITION V.2: The recurrence relation (25) has a unique stationary solution 0 =
(5,9)' > 0 given by
S = 7[1 + (1-7) '^1A ; (29)
0 = ^[(i_^)^/A, (30)
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where A > 0 denotes the determinant of the matrix [7 —(1 —7)M].
For easier comparison with Loury (1981), who focuses exclusively onstationary solutions,
it will henceforth be assumed that the coefficient vector coincides with ^ for all t > 1.
Combining Corollary V.l and Proposition V.2, it is then straightforward to show that each
parent's optimal choices (27) and (28) for human capital investment and consumption remain
positive as long as he earns a positive after-tax income Titya.
The next two propositions characterize the long-run behavior of dynasty income and
intensity-of-efFort levels under libertarian and egalitarian tax policies. For ease of notation,
let
= (log(y.O'-log(nv,(_i))' (31)
denote the indicated logarithmic transformation oftheperiod-t income and intensity-of-effort
levels (yii, 7^t•,^-l)' for dynasty i. Also, let E[' | 5i] denote an expectation conditional on the
period 1 social state vector,
= ((yuj"io),...,(m,T^Aro),r,A^) . (32)
The expectation is assumed to be taken with respect to the joint distribution for ability
levels across dynasties over time.
For the libertarian tax policy r = 0, it follows from (19) that the after-tax income Tuyn
for each dynasty i in each period t satisfies Tayit = y,-(, implying that no redistribution occurs.
The next proposition shows that the expected income and intensity-of-effort levels of each
dynasty z, in log form, converge over time to stationary limiting values under a libertarian
tax policy.
PROPOSITION V.3; Suppose that government in period 1 implements a permanent lib




^it I5i] = [/ —M'] di , (33)
where M' denotes the transpose of the matrix M appearing in relation (25), and the 2x1
vector di has the form
di = (log(C)+ m£[log(a,-)],-log(D))' (34)
for certain constant terms C and D. If the stationary probability distributions fi and fj that
govern ability levels for dynasties i and j in each period t are identical, then di = dj.
In the case of an egalitarian tax policy t = 1/A^, it follows from (19) that the after-tax
income for each dynasty i in each period t satisfies
N
Tityit = Y^VjtlN = yt ,
3=1
(35)
implying that each dynasty receives an equal share of total social income. The next propo
sition provides a partieil characterization of long-run outcomes for this case. More precisely,
given the assumption that the expected values for both social income and individual dynasty
incomes in log form converge over time to finite stationary values, analytical expressions are
derived for long-run expected dynasty incomes and intensity-of-effort levels in log form.
PROPOSITION V,4: Suppose that government in period 1 implements a permanent egal
itarian tax policy T= IfN, known to all agents in all dynasties. Suppose, also, thatfor each
dynasty i.
^lnnE[log(y() I5i] = Ki + J]m£;[log(yi() I5i (36)
for some constant Ki, where the limits in (36) are finite valued. Then for each dynasty i,
lim E[xit I5i] = [/ - M'] ^hi ,
t—KX) J • '
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(37)
where M' denotes the transpose of the matrix M appearing in relation (25), and the compo
nents of the 1x2 vector h\ = ^^.ke the form
h\i ~ log(C') + m£[log(ai)] - bv \og{N) + [u+ av]Ki ; (38)
h2i = - log(D) + Mog(A^) - aKi . (39)
The constant terms C and D in (38) and (39) are the same as in (34)-
It then follows as a corollary to Proposition V.4 that, under an egalitarian tax policy,
the expected long-run marginal return to schooling decreases for each dynasty child as the
total number of dynasties increases.
COROLLARY V.2: Suppose the hypotheses of Proposition V.4 hold. Then the expected
long-run marginal return to schooling effort in log form for each dynasty i is a strictly
decreasing function of the total number N of dynasties, of the form
lim £;[Iog(r?,) Isi] = i,- - iJlog(iV) , (40)
where the constants Li are i? > 0 are independent of N.
Given (36), the following proposition establishes that each dynasty in the long run can
expect to be worse off under pure egalitarianism than under pure libertarianism. Moreover,
the greater the number of dynasties, the greater is the extent to which the dynasties are
worse off under egalitarianism.
Proposition V.5: Suppose condition (36) holds. Then for all sufficiently large N the
expected income and intensity-of-effort levels in log form for each of the N dynasties are
strictly lower in the long run under the egalitarian tax policy r = l/N than under the
libertarian tax policy r = 0; and this discrepancy increases with increases in N.
As will be seen in section VI, our simulation results suggest that the regularity condition
(36) is indeed satisfied for the illustrative Basic Economy. Averaged across runs in log form,
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social income levels, dynasty income levels, and dynasty intensity-of-efFort levels all appear
to converge to stationary limiting values under the egalitarian tax policy. Morever, the
expected income, effort, and social welfare levels achieved under the egalitarian tax policy
fall well short of the levels achieved under the libertarian tax policy, even for N = 2.
The final proposition of this section provides another interesting check on the validity of
the simulation results reported below in section VI. If average dynasty income constitutes a
sufficiently good approximation for the true expected dynasty income for any dynasty i in
any period then the true expected tax/subsidy level for dynasty i in period t\s a. strictly
increasing function of the tax policy r. That is, the more egalitarian the government's tax
policy, the higher the subsidy level (or the lower the tax level) that dynasty i can expect to
receive (or to pay).
PROPOSITION V.6: Suppose that average dynasty income in some period t closely ap
proximates the true expected dynasty income for dynasty i in period t, conditional on the
period 1 state vector si. That is, suppose
for some e G {1,..., A^}. Then
N




> 0 . (42)
VI. Simulation Results
The illustrative Basic Economy outlined in section IV is too complex to allow a detailed
analytical characterization ofthe economy's responses to changes in the tax policy r. Simu
lation experiments were therefore conducted to determine how different tax policies influence
economic growth and human capital investment in this economy.
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To operationalize the model, specifications are needed for the number of dynasties, the
distribution of abilities, and the parameters characterizing the utility and income functions.
The number of dynasties N was first set at 2. Ability a was assumed to be distributed
uniformally over the range (0,1), implying a mean ability of .5. The value of 7, the exponent
on current consumption in the utiHty function (16), was set to .5. The parameters of the
income function (14) were set at A= .5, m = .5, u = .5, and v = .5. Since A serves as a
scaling variable, we can generate proportionally larger or smaller measures of income without
altering the relative levels of the variables by rescaling the value of A.
Various parameterizations were tried to determine the sensitivity of the qualitative results
to changes in the model parameters. The qualitative results proved to be quite robust to
modifications in the parameters.
Each simulation was replicated 40 times over a 40 generation horizon. In each run, each
dynasty received 40 independent draws from the uniform ability distribution, one draw per
generation. For all runs, the starting values for parental income and schooling effort were
initiahzed to be one. First, the purely Hbertarian tax policy (r = 0) was run. For each
dynasty in each year, the simulation generated values for income, consumption, schooling
effort, and human capital investment. Then, holding fixed the sequence of ability draws, the
simulation was rerun with progressively more egalitarian tax policies, endingwith the purely
egalitarian tax policy (r = N/2 = .5). For each tax policy r, we also measured after-tax
income and the tax/subsidy position of each djmasty. Finally, gross national products were
computed by summing across dynasties at a point in time. Statistical summaries of the
simulations are reported in Tables 1-4.
Table 1 contains the results from ourbase run. For each variable, we report the mean and
standard deviation taken over 40 replications of39 generations ofgenerated data. The initial
generation was deleted since all runs had the same initial levels of income and effort. For
the two-dynasty model, this implies 3120 observations (39 x 40 x 2). The simple correlation
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between current and once-lagged variables are also reported to determine the extent to which
parent and child outcomes are correlated.
—Table 1 About Here—
Immediately apparent from Table 1 is that tax poHcies can increase human capital pro
duction, as in the model by Loury (1981). With twodynasties, the tax policy r can vary from
0 to .5. A relatively small tax policy (r = .04) increases income and parental investment
in children. It also reduces the variance in those parental investments across households.
By transferring income toward poorer households, poorer parents are able to invest in the
education of their high ability children. This reduces the inefficiency in human capital in
vestment caused by the relative overinvestment in the children of high income parents and
the relative underinvestment in children of low income parents. As a result, the economy as
a whole benefits. Moreover, introduction of the tax policy begins to reduce the variance in
after-tax income. The reduction in uncertainty about future income and consumption is a
second benefit from the tax policy.
The result that tax policies can increase expected GNP is in marked contrast to the
implications of the model of King and Rebelo (1990), who found that increasing taxes uni-
formaUy reduced GNP growth. Nevertheless, Table 1 also indicates that a moderate tax
policy dominates relatively more egalitarian tax policies. Although transfers allow poorer
parents to invest more in their children, the income taxes used to finance the transfers also
lower the expected marginal returns to these investments for all children. To see this, note
that an increase in r decreases the child's expected marginal return to schooling effort in
equation (21). As children see the expected marginal return from their human capital invest
ments declining, they apply less effort to their schooling. This reduction in effort begins at
relatively modest tax policy levels, and effort continues todecline as the tax policy becomes
progressively more egalitarian. In the limit, schooling effort under the perfectly egalitarian
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tax policy r = .5 is only 55 percent of the level under the libertarian tax policy r = 0. As a
result, the GNP attained under a policy that guarantees income equality averages just over
one-half the level of GNP attained under a policy that involves no income redistribution.®
These findings are consistent with the predictions of Proposition V.5.
Table 1 also tells how a parent's income is related to his child's income. As tax policies
become more egaUtarian, the correlation between the before-tax income of a parent and
child falls monotonically. The same is not true of after-tax income. The reduction in after
tax income correlation across generations is more moderate. As r rises from 0 to .15, the
correlation coefficient declines by .45 for before-tax income, but by only .19 for after-tax
income. Thereafter, while intergenerational income correlations continue to fall for before-
tax income, they begin to rise for after-tax income. In the limit, the intergenerational
after-tax income correlation under the perfectly egalitarian tax policy r = .5 is larger than
under the libertarian tax poHcy r = 0. The depressing effect of the perfectly egalitarian tax
policy on human capital investment reduces the rate of growth and the variance in GNP
to such an extent that it increases the intergenerational correlation in incomes. Since GNP
is shared equally by all households, the intergenerational correlation in dynasty after-tax
income is exactly the same as the intergenerational correlation in GNP.
By lowering incentives to invest in human capital, the tax policy r also increases the rel
ative importance oftheability draw in determining relative pre-tax income across dynasties.
As a result, the intergenerational correlation in dependency (as measured by the autocor
relation of T,() declines as the tax policy becomes more egalitarian. Since is above 1 for
subsidized households and below 1for taxed households, the decline in the intergenerational
correlation implies that children from relatively poorer households have a higher probability
of receiving above average pre-tax earnings under more egalitarian tax policies. Of course,
^Recall from section Vthat, even under a perfectly egalitarian tax policy, each parent will still desire
to invest a positive amount of resources in his child's education as long as the parent's after-tax income is
positive.
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dependency is measured relative to average earnings in the economy, and not in any absolute
sense. As such, the low-income households in the relatively less-egalitarian economies will
still earn more on average than the higher-income households under the perfectly egalitarian
regime.
Proposition V.6 predicts that dynasties will expect to receive a higher subsidy (or lower
tax) from the government as the tax policy becomes more egalitarian. This is clearly borne
out in the simulations. The expected value of tu rises from 1.0 to 1.15 as r increases from 0
to .5.
One last outcome from the simulations in Table 1 is that households allocate about 39
percent of their after-tax income to their children and the remainder to consumption. Olson
(1983, p. 40) estimated for the United States that two-parent families with two children
born in 1980 would allocate about 37 percent of their income to raising their children to age
22. Thus, the parameterizations in Table 1 yield reasonable estimates of parental resource
allocations.
It is important to determine the sensitivity of the conclusions derived thus far to changes
in the parameters. Simulations were run assuming different values of the parameters of the
utility function, the income function, and the number of dynasties. In Table 2, we lower the
utility function weight 7 on current consumption to .25, thereby raising the utility function
weight [1 —7] on future consumption to .75. As a result, parents increase their investment
in their children and the economy grows to almost five times the leyels in Table 1. However,
none of the qualitative implications change relative to those derived from Table 1. Small
tax policies raise expected income and lower the variance in income, but progressively more
egalitarian tax policies ultimately lower income, GNP, schooling effort, and human capital
investment. Initially, taxes lower the intergenerational correlation in after-tax income, but
ultimately the highest intergenerational correlations are found under the perfectly egalitarian
tax policy. The shareof income devoted to children rises to 59 percent, well above the actual
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national average in the United States.
—Table 2 About Here
in Table 3, the utility parameters are the same as in Table 1, but we increase the income
elasticity (i.e., the elasticity of a child's income) with respect to parental human capital
investment from tz = .5 to w= .75 and lower the income elasticity with respect to schooling
effort from f = .5 to u = .25. This change in parameterization leaves the income elasticity
with respect to the scale factor A unchanged at 1; see equation (14). Comparing Table 3
with Table 1, tax policies involving increcised income transfers now initially have a relatively
larger positive effect on dynasty incomes and on GNP, arid the adverse effects of income
transfers on these variables do not outweigh the positive effects until later in the progression
toward more egahtarian tax policies. Nonetheless, the general Table 1 pattern of results
still holds. Perfectly egalitarian tax policies are still dominated by purely libertarian tax
policies, and the intergenerational correlation in after-tax income is still highest under the
egalitarian tax policy. The share of household income devoted to children is 45 percent, a
bit high relative to the 37 percent reported by Olson (1983).
—Table 3 About Here—
As the number of dynasties increases, GNP growth should be smoothed since extreme
individual ability draws will have a smaller effect on national income. This is shown clearly
in Table 4. The coefficient of variation in GNP is about two-thirds the level in Table 1.
However, the increase in the number of dynasties also reduces expected marginal returns to
schooling effort, consistent with Corollary V.2. Individuals have a greater incentive to free
ride on the economy as tax policies become more egalitarian. In the perfectly egalitarian
regime, schooling effort falls to .64, only 43 percent of the schooling effort in the perfectly
egalitarian two-dynasty economy in Table 1. The free-rider problem is so great under the
perfectly egalitarian tax policy that GNP with five dynasties is not much larger than with two
25
dynasties, and dynasty average income is less than half that in the two-dynasty economy.
Licreasing the number of dynasties exacerbates the disincentive effects of egalitarian tax
policies.
—Table 4 About Here—
All of the statistics reported thus far have looked at the generated data over the entire
trajectory of 40 generations. The analytical results reported in section V predict that these
data values should converge in expectation to steady state levels under each of the two tax
policy extremes, libertarianism and egalitarianism. In Figure 2, the time path of average
GNP is graphed for six tax policies spanning these two extremes. In each case the time
paths appear to level off after fifteen to twenty generations. The time paths show very
similar GNP levels for the three most libertarictn tax policies, and then show progressively
lower GNP levels for the remaining three most egalitarian tax policies.
—Figure 2 About Here—
Another method for assessing the various taxpolicies is tomeasure the expected lifetime
utihty levels associated with these policies. By relation (17), the log of the true lifetime
utility Uii achieved by a dynasty i parent in period 1 can be expressed as an infinite sum
in log form of all of the instantaneous utilities achieved by dynasty t parents in periods
i > 1. We constructed a truncated approximation for this infinite sum by summing over the
instantaneous utiHties achieved by dynasty i parents in generations fifteen through thirty-
five only. This approximation was exponentiated to reclaim an estimate Un for Un. The
expected Hfetime utility of aperiod 1parent under agiven tax policy r was then estimated by
first averaging the estimates across dynasties ?= 1,..., TV for each of forty repHcations of
the economy under the tax policy r, and then further averaging these averages over the forty
runs. To check the robustness of our expected lifetime utility estimate, we also calculated
a second estimate by repeating the same procedure using a truncated approximation which
26
included the instantaneous utilities achieved by dynasty i parents in generations twenty
through forty only.
Table 5 reports these estimated expected lifetime utilities for a number of different in
come, effort, and utility parameter specifications. These results generally mimic the results
reported above for the simple GNP measure of welfare. For each reported parameter speci
fication, the perfectly libertarian tax policy (r = 0) yields higher welfare than the perfectly
egalitarian tax policy (r = .5), but small positive tax policies dominate both of these ex
treme tax policies. The utility welfare measure does rank modestly egalitarian tax policies
(e.g., r = .08) more highly than does a simple comparison of GNP. The reason is that pos
itive tax policies lower uncertainty about income, even if they may slightly lower expected
income. Small tax policies have bigger welfare-improving effects as the utility weight 7 on
current consumption decreases, and also as the income function parameter u increases, i.e.,
as parental human capital investments become more productive. Small tax policies become
less welfare-enhancing as the number of dynasties increases.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of redistributive income tax policies on human
capital investment, per capita GNP, and social welfare in the context of a multi-dynasty
overlapping generations economy. We find that modest redistributive tax policies can raise
human capital investment, per capita GNP, and social welfare by increasing the human
capital investments of relatively poor families in their children. Further welfare gains are
obtained from the reduction in uncertainty regarding after-tax incomes that results from the
implementation of the transfer program.
Nevertheless, the taxes which funds these transfers also lower children's perceptions of
their marginal returns to schooling. The resulting adverse effects on schooling effort quickly
overtake the beneficial effects of the transfers as the tax policy becomes progressively more
27
egalitarian. In the limit, a purely egalitarian tax policy lowers schooling effort to such a
great extent that per capita GNP and social welfare fall well short of the levels achieved
under a purely libertarian tax policy. These adverse effects on schooling effort worsen as the
number of dynasties increases. Also, human capital investment and per capita GNP growth
are more adversely affected in economies in which parents place a relatively large weight
on current consumption, and in economies in which parental investments in their children's
human capital are relatively less productive.
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